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About The frontier. (O'Neill City, Holt County, Neb.) 1880-1965 | View Entire Issue (Dec. 16, 1897)
THE FRONTIER. rtniLISHED EVERY THURSDAY BY TRR FRONTIER PRINTING COMPANY. O’NEILL, - - NEBRASKA. JTKINLEY’S MESSAGE. READ BEFORE THE NATION AL CONGRESS. ENMlta *f Our Money isy.tem Pointed Oat—The Caban Qncltlon DI.en.MiA at bnith — Other Foreign Matter.— Ip«ed7 Annexation of Unwell Urged Ala.Ira in Mood of Attention, Ktc. Jtatlonal and International Qu*«tlon«. WASHINGTON. Dec. 7.—The mes sage of President McKinley is as fol lows: . _ To the Senate and House of Repre sentatives: It gives me pleasure to ex tend greeting to the Fifty-fifth con gress,assembled in regular session at the seat of government, with many of -whose senators and representatives 1 have been associated .in the legisla tive sort ice. Their meeting occurs lin ger lelicltous conditions, justi'ylnj sincere congratulation and calling for «ur grateful acknowledgment to a be neficent Providence which has so sig nally blessed and prospered us as a nation. Peace and good will with all the nations of the earth continue un broken. A matter of genuine satisfaction is the growing feeling of fraternal ro gard and unification of all sections of «ur country, the Incompleteness of which hat too long delayed realization cf the highest blessings of the union. The spirit of patriotism is universal and is ever increasing in fervor. The public questions which now most en gross us are lifted far above either partisanship, prejudice or former sec tional difference. They affect every part of our common country alike, and permit of no division on ancient lines. Questions of foreign policy, of revenue, the soundness of the currency, the Inviolability of national obligations, the Improvement of the public service appeal to the individual con»etouC'> every earnest citizen to whatever party he belongs, or in whatever sec tion of the country he may reside. The extra session of thlB congress, which closed during July last enacted Important legislation, and while its tttll effect has not yet been realized, what it has already acompllshed as sures os of its timeliness and wisdom. To test its permanent value further time will be required and the people, satisfied with itB operation and re sults, thus far, are in no mind to with hold from it a fair trial. Tariff legislation having been settled by the extra session of congress, the question next pressing for considera tion is that of the currency. The work st putting our finances upon a sound basis, difficult as it may seem, will appear easier when we recall the finan cial operations of the government since 1866. On the 30th day of June ®f that year we had outstanding de mand liabilities in the sum of $728, •68,477.41. On the 1st of January, 1879. these liabilities had been reduced to $443,889,495.88. Of our Interest-bear tag obligations the figures are even more striking. On July 1, 1866, the principal of the interest-bearing debt of the government was $2,332,331,208. On the 1st of July, 1803. this sum had boTi reduced to $585,037,108 or u:i ag Segate reduction of $1,747,294,108. The tereat-bearlng debt of the United States on the 1st day of December, 1897, was $847,365,620. The govern ment money now outstanding (Decem ber 1) consists of $346,681,016 of United States notes, $107,793,280 of treasury notes issued by authority of the law of 1890, $384,963,304 of Bllvor certificates and $G1,280,761 of standard diver dollars. With the great resources of the gov ernment and with the honorable ex cmple of the past before us, we ought Cot to hesitate to enter upon a cur rency revision which will make our demand obligations less onerous to the government and relieve our. flnan dial laws from ambiguity and doubt. The brief review of what was ac complished from the close of the war - to 1893, makes unreasonable and •roundless any distrust either of our •naneitil ability or soundness, white the situation from 1893 to 1897 must admonish congress of the immediate .aecessity of so legislating as to make the return of the conditions then pre vailing impossible. There are many plans proposed as a remedy for the evil.' Before we can and the true remedy we must appre ciate the real evil. It is not that our currency of every kind is not good, for every dollar of it is good; good be cause the government’s pledge is to *WP lt *o- and that pledge will not be broken. However, the guaranty of our Purpose to keep the pledge will be best mown by advancing toward its ful filment. of th? pr€Mnt "jrstem is found In the great cost to the govern ment of maintaining the parity of our aurerent forms of money, that is,keep tag all of them at par with gold. We aurely cannot be longer heedless of the burden this imposes upon the people, awn under fairly prosperous condl nons, while the past four years have demonstrated that it is not only an ex pensive charge to the government but a dangerous menace to the national tt is manifest that we must devise 2*5“ P,a“ to Protect the government ***ln®t bond issues tor repeated re demptions. We must either curtail the opportunity for speculation, made easy nythe multiplied redemptions of our demand obligations or to increase the aold reserve tor their redemption. We Save 9900,000,000 of currency which the ■onrnment by solemn enactment has XS^Sk,en l0,.ke!p at p*r with gold. Kobody is obliged to redeem in gold Mt the government The banks are cot required to redeem in gold. The forernment is obliged to keep equal With gold all its outstanding currency «M coin obligations, while its re not roquired to be paid in CMd. They are paid in every kind of 2®»«y but gold, and the only means ag which the government can with osrtslnty get gold is by borrowing. It dan get it in no other way when it meat needs it The government, with dnt any fixed gold revenue, is pledg ed to maintain gold redemption, which is has steadily and faithfully done, and which under the authority now given it will continue to do. The law which requires the govern ment after having redeemed its notes to pay them out again as current funds demands a constant replenish ment of the gold reserve. This is es pecially so in times of business panic and when the revenues are insuffi cient to meet the expenses of the gov ernment. At such times the govern ment has no other way to supply its deficit and maintain redemption but through the increase of its bonded in debtedness, and during the adminis tration of my predecessor 1262,313,409 of 4% per cent bonds were Issued and sold and the proceeds used to pay the expenses of the government in excess of the revenues and sustain the gold reserve. While it is true that the greater part of the proceeds of these bonds were used to supply deficeint revenues, a considerable portion was required to maintain the gold reserve. With our revenues equal to our ex pend'tures there would be no deficit requiring the issuance of bonds. But If the giiJd reserve falls below $100, 000,000 li <w will it be replenished ex cept by selling more bonds? Is there any other way practicable under ex isting law? The serious nue&Mnn. then Is, shall we continue the policy that has been pursued In the past— that Is, when the gold reserve reaches the point of danger, issue more bonds and supply the needed gold, or shall we provide other means to prevent these recurring drains upon the gold reserve? If no further legislation is had and the policy of selling bonds is to be continued, then congress should givo the secretary of the treas ury authority to sell bonds at long or short periods, bearing a less rate of interest than Is now authorized by law. I earnestly recommend as soon aa the receipts of the government are quite sufficient to pay all the expenses of the government, that when any of the United States notes aye presented for redemption In gold, and are re deemed in gold, such notes shall be kept and set apart, and only paid out In exchange for gold. This is an ob vious duty. If the holder \cf the United States note prefers the gold and gets it from the government, he should not receive back from the gov ernment a United States note without paying gold in return for It. The reason for this is made all the more apparent when the government Issues an interest bearing debt to provide gold for the redemption of United States notes—a non interest bearing debt. Surely it should not pay them out again except on demand, for gold. If they are put out in any other way they may return again, to be followed by another bond issue to redeem a non-interest bearing debt. In my view it is of the utmost im portance that the governmmit should be relieved from the business of pro viding all the gold required for ex changes and export. This responsibil ity is alone borne by the government without any of the usual and neces sary banking powers to help itself. The banks do not feel the strain of the gold redemption. The whole Strain rests upon the government and the size of the gold reserve in the treasury has come to be, with or with out reason, the signal of danger or of security. This ought to be stopped. If we are to have an era of prosper ity In the country, with sufficient re ceipts for the expenses of the govern ment, we may feel no great embar rassment from our present currency, but the danger still exists and will be ever present, menacing us as long as the present ysstem continues. And beside it is in times of adequate rev enues and business tranquility that the government should prepare for the worst. We cannot avoid without serious consequences the wise con sideration and prompt solution of this question. The secretary of the treasury has outlined a plan in great detail for the purpose of removing the threatened, recurrence of a depleted gold reserve and save ns from future embarrass ment on that account. To this plan I invite your careful consideration. I concur with the secretary of the treasury in his recommendation that national banks be allowed to issue notes to the face value of the bonds they have deposited for circulation, and that the tax on circulating notes secured by deposit of such bonds be reduced to one-half of 1 per cent per annum. I also Join him in reccom mending that authority be given for the establishment of national banks with a minimum capital of $25,000. This will enable the smaller villages and agricultural regions of the coun try to be supplied with currency to meet their needa I recommend* that the Isbus of national bank notes be restricted to the denomination of $10 and upward If the suggestions I have herein made shall have the approval of congress then I would reconmmend that na tional banks be required to redeem their notes In gold. REVIEW OP SITUATION IN CUBA. The moat Important problem with which this government is now called upon to deal pertaining to Its foreign relations concerns Its duty towards Spain and the Cuban Insurrection. Problems and condition a mnrA n* inoa in common with those now existing have confronted this government at various times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest, growing discontent, an ef fort toward a larger enjoyment of lib erty and self-control, of organized re sistance to the mother country, or de pression and distress and warfare, and of Ineffectual settlement, to be fol lowed by renewed revolt. For no en during period since the enfranchise ment of the continental possessions of Spain in the western continent has the condition of Cuba or the policy of Spain toward Cuba not caused con cern to the United States. The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold up on the island and tho political vicis situdes and embarassments of the home government might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental pow er, called forth, between 1823 and 1860. various emphatic declarations of the policy of the United States to permit no disturbances of Cuba's connection with Spain unless in the direction of independence or acquisition by the United States through purchase; nor has there been any condition to this declared policy since upon the part of the government The revolution which began In 1SC8 lasted for ten years, despite the stren uous efforts of the successive peninsu lar governments to suppress It. Then, as now, the government of the United States testified its grave concern and offered its aid to put an end to blood shed in Cuba. The overtures made by General Grant were refused and the war dragged, entailing great loss of life and treasure and Increased injury to American Interests, besides throw ing enhanced - burdens of neutrality upon this government. In 1878 peace was brought about by the truce of Zanjon, obtained by negotiations be tween the Spanish commander Mar tinez de Campos and the insurgent leaders. The present insurrection broke ont In February, 1895. It is not my pur pose at this time to recall its remark able Increase or to characterize its tenacious resistance against the enor mous forces massed against it by Spain. The revolt and the efforts to subdue It carried destruction to every quarter of the Island, developing wide proportions and defying the efforts of Spain for Its suppression. The civ ilized code of war has been disre garded, no less so by the Spaniards than by the Cubans. The existing conditions cannot hut fill this government and the American people with the gravest apprehension. There Is no desire on the part of our people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and con tented, enjoying that measure of self control which is the Inalienable right of man, protected In their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country. The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tendering the friendly offices of this government, failed. Any mediation on our part was not ac cepted. In brief the answer read: "There is no effectual way to pacify 'Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country.” Then only could Spain act in the promised direction, of her own motion and after her own plaits. The cruel policy of concentration was in itiated February 16, 1896. The pro ductive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated and the agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their land laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late cabinet of Spain Justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the Insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermination. Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on re peated occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this government. There was much of public condemna tion of the treatment of American cit izens by alleged illegal arrests and long imprisonment, awaiting trial or pending protracted judicial procedure. I felt it my first duty to make instant demand for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest. Before the change of the Spanish cab inet in October last twenty-two pris oners, citizens of the United States, had been given their freedom. For the relief of our own citizens suffering because of the conflict, the aid of congress was sought in a special message and under the appropriations of April 4, 1897, effective aid has been given to American citizens in Cuba, and many of them at their own re quest have been returned to the united States. The Instructions given to our new minister to Spain before his departure for his post directed him to impress upon the government the sincere wish of the United* States to lend its aid toward the ending of the war in Cuba by reaching a peaceful and last ing result, just and honorable alike to Spain and the Cuban people. These Instructions recited the character and duration of the contest, the widespreal losses it entails, the burdens and re straints it imposes upon us, with con stant disturbance of national interests and the injury resulting from an in definite continuance of this state of things. It was stated that at this juncture our government was con strained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by her own in terests and every sentiment of human ity should put a stop to this destruct ive war and make proposals of settle ment, honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony. It was urged that as a neighborhlng nation, with large interests in Cuba, we could be requir ed to wait only a resonable time for the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the is land; that we could not contemplate aa indefinite period for the accomplish ment of this result No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to to Spain could attach, and, indeed, precise proposals were withheld to avoid embarrassment to that govern ment. All that was asked or expected was that some safe way might be speeauy provided and permanent peace restored. It so chanced that the con sideration of this offer, addressed to the same Spanish administration which had directed the tenders of my predecessor, and which for more than iwu jcaio uuu puuicu uicu auu uctw ure into Cuba in the fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell to others. Be tween the departure of General Wood ford, the new envoy, and his arrival in Spain, the statesman who had shaped the policy of his country fell ,by the hand of an assassin, and al though the cabinet of the late pre mier still held office and received from our envoy the proposals he bore, that cabinet gave place Within a few daya thereafter to a new administration un der the leadership of Sagasta. The reply to our note was received on the 23d day of October. It is in the direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly purposes of this government. It admits that our country is deeply affected by the war in Cuba and that its desires for neace are just. It declares that the present Spanish government is bound by every consideration to a change in policy that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within reason able time. To this end Spain has de cided to put into effect the political reforms heretofore advocated by the present premier, without naltlng for any consideration in the path which In its judgment leads to peace. The military operations. It is said, will continue, but wil be humane and con ducted with all regard to private rights, being accompanied by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba, while guarding Spanish sover ingty. This, it is claimed, will result in investing Cuba with a distinct per sonality; the island to be governed by an executive and by a local council, or chamber, reserving to Spain the con trol of the foreign relations, the army and navy and the judicial administra tion. To accomplish this the present government proposes to modify ex isting legislation by decree, leaving the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators and deputies, to solve the economic problem and properly distribute the existing debt. In the absence of a declaration of the measures that the government proposes to take In carrying out its proffer of good offices, it suggests that Spain be left free to conduct opera tions and grant political reforms, while the United States for its part shall enforce its neutral obligations and cut off the assistance which it is asserted the insurgents receive from this country. The supposition of an indefinite prolongation of the war is denied. It is asserted that the western provinces are already well night re claimed; that the planting of cane and tobacco therein has been resumed and that by force of arms and new and amply reform very early and completed pacification is hoped for. The immediate amelioration of ex isting conditions under the new ad ministration of Cuban affairs is pre dicted, and therewith all the disturb ance and all occasion for any change *of attitude on the part of the United States. Discussion of questions of in ternational duties and -responsibilities of the United States, as Spain under stands them, is presented, with an ap parent disposition to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cog nizant of the constant efforts this gov ernment has made at the cost of mil lions, and by the employment of the administrative machinery at the com mand of the nation to perform its full duty according to the laws of nations. That it has successfully presented the departure of a single military expedi tion or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufflclenty answer. But of this aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly perform ed obligation, due response to this eharxe baa been made in diplomatic is sues. Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this gov ernment has never in any way abro gated its sovereign prerogative of re serving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and in con sonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people should the prolongation of the strife so de mand. Of the untried measures there re main only: “Recognition of the in surgents as belligerents: recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by im posing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention! In favor of one or the other parties. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot bd thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggregssion." Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been canvassed as a possible, if not in evitable step, both in regard to the previous ten years’ struggle and dur ing the present war. I am not un mindful that the two houses of con gress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed requiring or Justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the senate voted a Joint resolution of like im port, which, however, was not brought to a vote in. the house. In the pres ence of these significant expressions of sentiment of the legislative branch, it behooves the executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest for Justification. It is to be seri ously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of sisterhood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, in short, of the essential qualifications of sovereignity by the insurgents and the conduct of the war by them ac cording to the recognized code of war are no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the recogniz ing state. The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1876, are signally rele vant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to re call them. At that time a ruinous con flict had for seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and the Just de mands of humanity, which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued un abated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously af fecting the commerce of all commer cial nations, but that of the United States more than any other by reason of proximity and larger trade and in tercourse. At inai junction uenerai C rant uttered these words, which now, r■« then, sum up the elements of the problem: “A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, In my opinion, Imprac ticable, the question which next pre sents itself is that of the recognition of the belligerent rights of the parties to the contest In a former message to congrcsss I had occasion to con sider this question and reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as yere its Incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. “It is possible that the acts of for eign powers, and even the acts of Spain itself of this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such rec ognition. But now, as in its past his tory, the United States should care fully avoid the false lights which might lead it into the mazes of doubt ful law and of questionable propri ety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule which has been its guide, of doing only that which is right and honest and of good report. The qucs I tloa of according or 'withholding rights of bellegerency must be judged in every case in view of the particulai attending facts. Unless justified by necessity it is always, and justly, re garded as an unfriendly act ana a gra tuitous demonstration of moral sup port to the rebellion. It is necessary, and it is required,, when the Interests and rights of another government or of its people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition of its relations, to the par ties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the sense of international law as war. “Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do not constitute war in the sense re ferred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba, the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of dignity, honesty and power, when free from sensitive, selfish and unworthy mo tives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial po litical organization, real, palpable and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of jus tice, with a local habitation, possess ing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory as to take the contest out of the cat egory of a mere rebellious insurrec tion, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on the terible footing of war, to which recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it. “The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not pos sessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers, except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehensloh of any of those sud den and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to pre cipitate upon the vessels both com mercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their rela tions to the parties to the contest. Considered as a question of expediency I regard the accordance of belliger ent rights still to be as unwise as I regard it to be, at present, indefen sible, as a measure of right. “Such recognition entails upon the country, according the rights of war 'which flow from it difficult and com plicated duties, and requires the ex action from the contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and obligations. It confers the right of search upon the high seas by ves sels of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption in vessels of the United States, to de tention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commercs on the high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the At lantic and Gulf states and between all of them and the states on the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The ex ercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two states. There can be little doubt as to what result supervision would before long draw this nation. It would be unworthy cf the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such result, by meas ures of questionable right or expedi ency, or by any indirection.” Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and re viewing its inconveniences and posi tive? dangers, still further pertinent considerations appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency unaccompanied by the resumption of international neutrality. Such rec ognition without more will confer upon neither-party to a domestic con flict a status-iot heretofore actually possessed nor • affect the relation of either party to other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutral ity which recites the de facto condi tion of belligerency as its motives. It announces a domestic law of neu trality in the declaring Btate. It as sumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a pub lie state of war. It warns all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the proclamation that they violate those rigorous obligations at thejir peril, and cannot expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas, and seiz ure of vessels and cargoes and contra brand of war and good prize under ad miralty law must, under international law, be admitted as a legitimate con sequence of a proclamation of bellig erency. While according the equal belligerent right" defined by public law to each party in our ports, dis favors would be imposed on both, which, while nominally equal, would weigh heavily on behalf of Spain her self. Possessing a navy and controll ing the ports of Cuba, her maratime rights could be asserted not only for the military investment of the island, but up to the margin of our own ter ritorial waterB, and a condition of things would exist for which the Cu bans within their own domain could not hope to create a parallel, while its creation of aid or sympathy from within our domains would be even more impossible than now, with the additional obligations of neutrality we would perforce assume. The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and ap plicable by our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United States no jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give to the United States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the paramount authority of Spain, according to the international code of war. For these reasons I regard the rec ognition of the belligerency of the Cuhans as now unwise, and therefore inadmissable. Should that step hereafter be deemed wise as a meas ure of right and duty the “secutive will take it. Intervention upon fcamanitarl&a grounds has been frequently suggest ed and has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest considers- , tion. But should such a step be now ] taken, when it is apparent that a ~V hopeful change has supervened in the- V policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new j government has taken office in the? mother country. It is pledged in ad vance to the declaration that all the effort in the world cannot suffice to. maintain peace inCuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution of the insular problem; that with a substi tution of commanders must come a. change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy, which shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to the “horrible alterna tive of taking to the thicket or suc cumbing in misery;” that reforme must be instituted in accordance with, the needs and circumstances of time,, and that these reforms, while design ed to give full autonomy to the colony and to create a virtual entity and self controlled administration, shall yet conserve and affirm the sovereignty off Spain by a just distribution of power* and burdens upon a basis of mutuah - interest untainted by methods of sel- : 'fish expediency. nie ursi aeis 01 me new govern ment lie in these honorable paths. The*• policy of cruel rapine and extermina tion that so long shocked the univer sal sentiment of humanity has been. ■ reversed. Under the new military commander a broad clemency is prof fered. Measures have already been set afoot to relieve the horrors or starvation. The power of the Spanish j armies, it is asserted, is to be use® ] not to spread ruin and desolation but j to protect the resumption of peaceful agricultural pursuits and productive industries. That past methods are* futile to force a peace by subjugation is freely admitted, and that ruin without conciliation must inevitably fail to win for Spain the fidelity of a. contented dependency. Decrees in application of the fore shadowed reforms have already been promulgated. The full text of these decrees has not been received, but an furnished in a telegraphic summary from our minster are: All civil an® electroal rights of peninsular Span-, iards are, in virtue of existing consti tutions authority, forthwith extended to colonial Spaniards upon ratifica tion by the Cortes. It creates a Cuban parliament, which, with the insular executive, can consider and vote upon all subjects affecting local order ant£ interests, possessing unlimited powers save as to matters of state, war and navy, as to which the governor general acts by his own authority as the del egate of the central government. This parliament receives the oath of the governor general to preserve faithfully the liberties and privileges of the col ony, and to it the colonial secretaries are responsible. It has the rj^ht to propose to the central government, through the governor general, modi fications of national charter an® to invite new projects of law or ex ecutive measures in the interest of ths- • colony. Besides its local powers it is com petent, flht, to regulate electoral reg istration and procedure and prescribe/ the qualifications of electors and theL manner of exercising suffrage; sscond,^k to organize courts of justice with na-^* tive judges from members of the lo cal bar; third, to frame the insular budget both as to expenditures and revenues to meet the Cuban share of the national budget, which later wiU be voted by the national Cortes, with the assistance of Cuban senators and « deputies; fourth, to institute or take* part in the negotiations of the na tional government for commercial treaties which may affect Cuban in terests; fifth, to accept or reject com mercial treaties which the national government may have concluded without the participation of the Cuban government; sixth, to frame the col oplal tariff, acting in accordance with the penisular government in schedul ing articles of mutual commerce be tween the mother country and the col onies. Before introducing or voting: upon a bill, the Cuban government, or the Chambers, will lay the project be fore the central government and hear its opinion thereon, all the corres pondence in such regard being mado public. Finally, all conflicts of Juris diction arising between the different municipal, provincial and insular as semblies, or between the latter and the insular executive power, and which from their nature may not be referable to the central government for decision,, shall be submitted to the courts. That the government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which re cession with honor is impossible can hardly be questioned; that in the few . weeks it has existed it has made earn est of the sincerity of its professions is undeniable. I shall not inpugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered to embarras it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spainandto our friendly relationswith Spain that it should be given a rea sonable chance to realize its expecta tions and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which it stands irrevocably committed. It .has recalled the commander whoss brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized world. It has modified the horrible order to concentration and has undertaken to care for the helpless and perihlt those who desire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so and assure them of the protection of the Spanish government in the lawful occupations. It ha3 just released the Competitor prisoners, heretofore sentenced to death, and who have been the subject of repeated diplomatic correspondency during this and preceding administra tions. Not a single American citizen 13 now under arrest or in confinement in Cuba of whom this government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate whether the indispena> able condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, ps well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not., the exigency of further and other ti action by the United States will re- J main to be taken. When that time 'r comes that action will be determined 1 in the line of the indisputable right and duty. It will be faced without misgiving and hesitancy in the light of the obligation this government owes to itself, to the people who have con.'